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Competing successfully against an intelligent adversary requires
the ability to mentalize an opponent’s state of mind to anticipate
his/her future behavior. Although much is known about what
brain regions are activated during mentalizing, the question of
how this function is implemented has received little attention to
date. Here we formulated a computational model describing the
capacity to mentalize in games. We scanned human subjects with
functional MRI while they participated in a simple two-player
strategy game and correlated our model against the functional MRI
data. Different model components captured activity in distinct
parts of the mentalizing network. While medial prefrontal cortex
tracked an individual’s expectations given the degree of model-
predicted influence, posterior superior temporal sulcus was found
to correspond to an influence update signal, capturing the differ-
ence between expected and actual influence exerted. These results
suggest dissociable contributions of different parts of the mental-
izing network to the computations underlying higher-order strat-
egizing in humans.
computational modeling  decision making  functional MRI 
neuroeconomics
Humans, like many other primates, live in a highly complexsocial environment in which it is often necessary to interact
with, and compete against, other individuals to attain reward.
Success against an intelligent adversary with competing objec-
tives likely depends on the capacity to infer the opponent’s state
of mind, to predict what action the opponent is going to select
in future, and to understand how an individual’s own actions will
modify and influence the behavior of one’s opponent. This
ability is often referred to as ‘‘mentalizing’’ and has been linked
to a number of specific regions thought to be specifically engaged
when processing socially relevant stimuli, and especially when
inferring the state of minds of others (1). Neuroimaging studies
in humans have implicated a specific network of brain regions
including dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (PFC), posterior supe-
rior temporal sulcus (STS), and the temporal poles (2, 3) while
subjects engage in tasks relevant to mentalizing, such as evalu-
ating false beliefs or social transgressions (4, 5), describing the
state of biological movements (6–8), and playing interactive
games (9–11). However, although these studies have provided
insight into what brain regions may be involved in the capacity
to mentalize, the question of how this function is implemented
at the neural level has received relatively little attention to date.
The goal of the present study was to build a simple model
describing computations underlying the capacity to mentalize (in
the context of a strategic game) and to determine whether different
components of this model were correlated with neural activity in
parts of thementalizing network. To assess competitive interactions
experimentally, we studied pairs of human subjects while they
played each other in a two-player strategic game called the ‘‘in-
spection’’ game (or generalized matching pennies), in which oppo-
nents have competing goals (Fig. 1A andB). One of the players was
being scanned with functional MRI (fMRI), and the opponent was
playing outside the scanner. The ‘‘employer’’ could either ‘‘inspect’’
or ‘‘not inspect,’’ and the ‘‘employee’’ could either ‘‘work’’ or
‘‘shirk.’’ The employer received 100 cents if he/she did not inspect
and the employee worked and 25 cents if he/she inspected and
caught the employee shirking. Otherwise he/she got zero cents. In
contrast, the employee got 50 cents for working when the employer
inspected and for shirking when the employer did not inspect,
otherwise getting zero cents as well. Both players had competing
objectives, in that when one playerwon in a given trial, the other one
lost.
A player can in principle use a number of different strategies to
try to win in such a game. Perhaps the simplest strategy is on each
trial to simply choose the action that in the recent past gave themost
reward. This strategy is referred to as reinforcement learning (RL)
and approximates the optimal solution for many different types of
decision problem in nonstrategic contexts, even for decision prob-
lems with complex higher-order structure whereby such structure
can be accommodated by a sufficiently nuanced model of the
state-space and transition probabilities (12, 13). However, such a
strategy would be devastating for an individual in a competitive
scenario because a clever opponent could detect the regularity in
the reinforcement learner’s choices to work out what action the
reinforcement learner is going to choose next and exploit that
knowledge by choosing the confounding response.
Amore sophisticated approach is to try to predict the opponent’s
next actions by taking into account the history of prior actions by
the opponent and then choosing the best response to that predicted
action, a strategy known as ‘‘fictitious play’’ (14–16). A fictive
learner is, in contrast to a reinforcement learner, employing an
elementary form of mentalizing, because they are engaging a
representation of the actions and intentions of their opponent.
However, an even more cognitively sophisticated and Machia-
vellian strategy a player could use in this game is to not only track
the opponent’s actions, but also to incorporate knowledge of how
one’s own actions influence the opponent’s strategy. Simply put,
this involves a player’s building a prediction of what the opponent
will do in response to the player’s own actions. For example, the
more the employer inspects, the higher the probability the em-
ployee will work in subsequent trials. The employer can then use
this knowledge to make choices with higher expected rewards in
subsequent trials, i.e., not inspect. We will term this strategy the
‘‘influence’’ learning model (see Table 1 for a comparison of the
different models).
Although the behavioral game theory literature has demon-
strated that humans think strategically in one-shot games [they
consider what the opponent could possibly believe (17, 18)], the
updating of beliefs about the beliefs of the opponent has rarely been
incorporated in the analysis of learning in repeated play. Our
modeling approach differs from the two exceptions (19, 20) in both
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its simplicity (fewer parameters are needed) and its form, which is
more relevant for neuroscience, because it disentangles the two
components of the prediction error, as we explain later on.
We chose the inspection game for our experimental study
because there is no simple best way of playing it (in game-theoretic
terms, it does not have a pure-strategy equilibrium): always inspect-
ingmakes the employee always work, in which case inspecting is not
optimal, etc. Hence, regardless of the learningmodel implemented,
strategies will keep switching, and, consequently, learning never
disappears.
Results
Model Fits to Behavior. To address which of the above strategies
most closely captured subjects’ behavior, we fit each model to
behavior separately and compared the goodness of fit of each
model. We found that the influence learning model provided a
significantly better fit to subjects’ behavior (P 0.005, paired t test)
than did either the fictitious play rule or the RL rule, even when
taking into account the different number of free parameters in each
model by performing an out-of-sample test [Fig. 1C and supporting
information (SI) Fig. S1]. The influence model also fit better than
a variation of the experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning
rule, which involves a combination of RL and fictitious play but has
the same number of parameters and hence is equal in model
complexity to the influence model (15). Fig. 1D shows the rela-
tionship between the probability of an action being selected as
predicted by the influence model, and actual subject choices. These
findings suggest that subjects are not only using representations of
the opponents’ future choices to guide choice, but are also employ-
ing representations of the opponents’ likely responses to their own
actions.
fMRI Correlates of Influence-Based Expectations. We next analyzed
the fMRI data from the player being scanned to determinewhether
we could find evidence of neural signals reflecting the different
components of the influence model, and, if so, whether those
signals are better accounted for by the influence model than by the
fictitious play or simple RL models. A comparison of brain signals
associated with the expected reward of the chosen action, as
predicted by eachmodel, is shown in Fig. 2A. Expected value signals
from the influence model were significantly correlated with neural
activity in medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), medial PFC
(mPFC) [encompassing both ventral and dorsal aspects, significant
at P 0.05 corrected for small volume (SVC)], and right temporal
pole (P  0.05 SVC). By contrast, only weak correlations with the
expected value signals from the fictitious play model were found in
mOFC, whereas no significant correlations were found with ex-
pected value as computed by the simple RL model.
Comparison of Influence, Fictitious, and RL Model Fits to fMRI Data.
We tested for brain regions showing a significantly better fit to the
influence model than the RL model. This analysis revealed signif-
icant effects extending from mid to dorsal mPFC (P  0.05 SVC;
Fig. 2B), as well as in the right temporal pole (Fig. S2). The
regression fits of the three models are shown in Fig. 2C for mPFC,
demonstrating the superiority of the influence model in accounting
for neural activity in this area.We then binned BOLD activity from
mPFC according to the expected reward as predicted by the
influencemodel to illustrate the relationship between evoked fMRI
responses and the model predictions (Fig. 2D). These data show
that the influence model provides a significantly better account of
the neural data in mPFC than does a simple RLmodel. In addition
to the voxel-based analysis we performed an ROI analysis by
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Fig. 1. Inspection game and behavioral results. (A) Two interacting players are each individually given two action choices at the beginning of each trial. Players
are given 1 second to respond, and their choices are highlighted with a red frame for another second before being covered with a blank screen. Five seconds
after the start of the trial, the actions of both players are shown to each player for 1.5 s, with the payoff each one individually receives shown at the top. (B) Payoff
matrix for the inspection game used in this paper. (C) Log likelihood errors for each computational model tested shows that the influence model, which
incorporates the effects of players’ actions influencing their opponents, has a better fit to subjects’ behavior than either the RL or fictitious play models or these
two models combined. To account for overfitting and the effects of differences in free parameters between models we used an out-of-sample prediction
validation technique, as shown in Fig. S1. Error bars show the SEM of individual log likelihoods. (D) Furthermore, the actual probability of a player taking a specific
behavioral action is linear with respect to the probability of choosing that action as computed by the influence model. Here, behavior and predictions are shown
separately for the employer and employee. Error bars are SEM over subjects.
Table 1. Model update rules
Model Update rule
RL Vt1
a  Vt
a  (Rt  Vt
a)
Fictitious pt1
  pt
  (Pt  pt
)
Influence pt1
  pt
  (Pt  pt
)  (Qt  qt
)
The RL model updates the value of the chosen action a with a simple
Rescorla–Wagner (35) prediction error (Rt  Vt
a) as the difference between
received rewards and expected rewards, where  is the learning rate. The
fictitious play model instead updates the state (strategy) of the opponent pt

with a prediction error (Pt pt
) between the opponent’s action and expected
strategy. The influence model extends this approach by also including the
influence (Qt  qt
) that a player’s own action Qt has on the opponent’s
strategy (see Methods).
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extracting averaged activity across voxels within an 8-mm sphere in
mPFC [centered onmean coordinates from ametaanalysis by Frith
and Frith (3)]. We fit the expected reward regressor from the RL
and the influencemodel separately to these data and compared the
regression fits across subjects using a paired t test. The expected
reward signal from the influence model provided a significantly
better fit than the expected reward signal from theRLmodel atP
0.005 within our mPFC ROI, confirming the conclusions from our
voxel-based analysis.
We then aimed to differentiate between the effects of the
influence model and the more closely related fictitious play model
in this area. For this, we looked specifically at the points in the
experiment when the predictions of these two models differ. In
particular, the influence model predicts that the expected value
after a switch in action choice (i.e.,moving fromworking to shirking
or vice versa on successive trials) is on average higher than the
expected reward when not switching choice (i.e., taking the same
action on successive trials), whereas the fictitious play and indeed
RL models predict exactly the opposite (Fig. 2E). This effect is
greatest for the employee, because behavioral fits indicate that
subjects exert more influence on their opponent when playing this
role. An analysis of BOLD activity in the mPFC region of interest
at the time of choice revealed a positive signal in this area on switch
compared with nonswitch trials for the employee, consistent with
the predictions of the influence model but not with either the
fictitious play or simple RL models (Fig. 2F). These results there-
fore suggest that the influence model does indeed account better
for neural activity in mPFC than the fictitious play model.
fMRI Correlates of Updating Signals for Influence Model. At the time
of outcome, according to the influence model, a player needs to
update his/her expectations of the opponent’s strategy using two
different components: an influence update signal found only in the
influence model and not in either of the other two models, which
encodes the magnitude by which the opponent’s behavior adapts
because of a player’s own action; and, in common with both the RL
model and the fictitious play model, a prediction error signal that
encodes the discrepancy between expected and actual rewards. We
found that neural activity in another key component of the men-
talizing network, STS (bilaterally), was significantly correlated with
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Fig. 2. Expected reward signals. (A) At the time of choice, the expected reward of the action selected by a player is shown across the brain as calculated by
different computational models. The expected reward signal from the influence model is correlated significantly with BOLD responses in mOFC (0, 36,21 mm,
z  3.56), mPFC (3, 63, 15 mm, z  3.29), and in the right temporal pole (42, 15, 39, z  3.98), the latter two areas surviving at P  0.05 correction for small
volume (SVC) within an 8-mm sphere centered on coordinates from areas implicated in mentalizing (3), whereas only the fictitious play model has significant
activity in mOFC (at P 0.001). The RL model had no significant activity correlating with expected reward anywhere in the brain. (B) An analysis to test for areas
showing neural activity related to expected reward, which is explained significantly better by the influence model than by the RL model, revealed statistically
significant effects in mPFC (3, 57, 12 mm, z 3.11; P 0.05 SVC). (C) The average correlation coefficients for each model from the area reported in B (extracted
from all voxels showing effects at P  0.005 in mPFC). All images shown depict whole-brain voxel-wise comparisons; small volumes are defined only for the
purposes of correction for multiple comparisons. (D) fMRI activity in mPFC shows a linear relation with binned expected reward probabilities as computed by
the influence model (fMRI activity extracted from individual peaks in a 10-mm search radius centered on peak from B). (E) The computational models tested in
this article make distinctly different predictions about the expected reward signals after switching actions (switch) or sticking to the same action (nonswitch)
as a consequence of influencing the opponent. Intuitively, the underlying reason is that both RL and fictitious play will most likely ‘‘stay’’ after a reward and
‘‘switch’’ after a nonreward. However, the influence model has a higher incentive to switch even after receiving a reward. That is, expected reward signals
associated with a specific action do not necessarily increase after the receipt of a reward when taking into consideration the influence that specific action exerts
on the opponent’s strategy. (F) fMRI responses in mPFC at the time of choice on switch compared with nonswitch trials show a response profile consistent with
the influence model and not the fictitious play models or RL models (the data are extracted from a 10-mm sphere centered on peak from B). The difference
between the employee and employer was significant at P  0.02.
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the influence update signal (P  0.05 SVC; Fig. 3A), suggestive of
a role for this region in guiding the update of expected value
representations in mPFC. Prediction error signals were found to
correlate with neural activity in ventral striatum bilaterally (see Fig.
S3), consistent with many previous findings implicating this area in
prediction error coding (21–24). Moreover, this analysis revealed
significant prediction error effects in mPFC, suggesting that this
signal could also contribute to the updating of expectations in this
region.
fMRI Correlates of Between-Subject Differences in Influence-Related
Strategizing. To further investigate differences between the influ-
ence and fictitious play models, we examined between-subject
variability in the degree to which the influence model provided a
better fit to subjects’ behavior than the fictitious play model, by
comparing the difference in the likelihoods of the two models and
correlating that with neural activity elicited by the influence update
signal. This measure can be taken as an assay of the individual
differences in the degree of influence-based strategizing within our
subject group. We found a significant between-subject correlation
in the degree of influence activity and the difference in likelihoods
between the influence and fictitious play models in dorsomedial
PFC (P  0.05 SVC; Fig. 3B). These results suggest that, among
subjects who strategizemore, the influence-basedmodel correlated
better with neural activity in mPFC.
Correlations Between Regions During Task Performance. Given the
structure of our computational model, an important implication of
our findings is that neural activity in mPFC ought to be predictable
from a combination of the signals contained in posterior STS
(pSTS) and ventral striatum. To test this hypothesis we computed
correlations between activity in mPFC and activity in pSTS and
ventral striatum separately for each different time point within a
trial. We found a significant increase in correlations between
activity in STS and mPFC and between activity in ventral striatum
andmPFCafter receipt of the outcome (when prediction errors and
influence errors are generated) compared with the period before
the outcome was delivered (significant at P 0.01 for both regions;
Fig. 4). Moreover, activity in mPFC at the time of outcome was
significantly better predicted by a linear combination of signals in
STS and ventral striatum than by the signals in either of these
regions alone (at P  106). These findings therefore support the
possibility that mPFC, ventral striatum, and pSTS constitute a
functionally interacting network underlying computations in stra-
tegic game playing, consistent with the tenets of our computational
model.
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Fig. 3. Influence signals in the brain. (A) At the time of outcome, the
influence update of the inferred opponent’s strategy shows significant cor-
relations with activity in STS bilaterally (57,54, 0 mm, z 3.32 and 60,54,
9 mm, z 3.35; P 0.05 SVC). (B) The degree to which a subject thinks he/she
is influencing his/her opponent can be measured by taking the difference in
log-likelihood fits between the influence and fictitious models on each play-
er’s behavior. Likewise, brain regions invoked in computing the influence on
the opponent will correlate more strongly with the influence model for
subjects invoking this approach when compared with subjects that do not.
Influence signals were found to significantly covary with the model likelihood
difference (influence fictitious) across subjects in mPFC (3, 51, 24 mm, z
4.09; P  0.05 SVC). (Right) The relationship between influence regression
coefficients and model likelihood differences in mPFC. All images shown
depict whole-brain voxel-wise comparisons; small volumes are defined only
for the purposes of correction for multiple comparisons.
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Fig. 4. Interregion correlation analysis. (A and B) Correlations among mPFC,
STS, and ventral striatum were computed for each time point within a trial to
determine whether there were significant changes in the correlations be-
tween these brain regions at the point the outcome was received (when
prediction errors were generated) compared with other time points in the
trial. Heat plots of region correlations through time are shown separately for
each subject, with correlations between mPFC and STS shown in A and
correlations between mPFC and ventral striatum (vStriatum) in B. Red indi-
cates a high correlation between both regions, and blue indicates a low
correlation. Shaded areas indicate the time subjects are given their choices (0
s, time of choice) and the time of outcome (5 s into trial). (C) The mean
correlation between regions is shown averaged across all subjects for each
time point in the trial. A significant increase in correlation after the outcome
of a trial was revealed was found at 6.5 s into the trial (significant at P 0.01
compared with the correlation at 4 s; paired t test). This supports the idea that
information processed at the time of outcome in STS and ventral striatum is
being shared with mPFC so as to facilitate updating in the expected reward for
a given action. (D) Scatter plots of BOLD activity from a typical subject showing
the correlation between regions after the trial outcome. Red lines indicates
the linear regression fit of STS activity against mPFC activity (Left) and of
ventral striatum activity against mPFC activity (Right).
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Discussion
In the present study we show that a model that captures an
updating strategy in which individuals keep track not only of the
actions of the opponent, but also of how opponents are influ-
enced in response to their own actions, provides a good account
of behavior during performance of a simple strategic game. We
also show that specific computational signals needed for the
implementation of such a strategy are correlated with neural
activity in different parts of the mentalizing network.
mPFC and pSTS were found to fulfill very different roles in the
context of our computational framework. Whereas activity in
mPFC was found to track the predicted future reward correspond-
ing to a particular choice given the degree of influence expected,
activity in pSTS was found to correspond to an update signal,
capturing the difference between the degree of influence expected
on a given trial and the actual influence exerted once the outcome
had been revealed.
Reward expectations in mPFC were found to be correlated
specifically with the predictions of the full influence model, sug-
gesting that these predictions take into account the subjects’
expectations of the degree of influence thatwould be exerted on the
opponent given the subject’s own inference of how the opponent
would respond to his or her own actions. By contrast, reward
expectations in this region were not captured well by either a
fictitious play model, which simply tracks the actions of the oppo-
nent without considering the opponent’s reactions to the subject’s
own actions, or by RL, which tracks only the reward expected given
previous choices of the same action. These findings suggest that
representations of expected reward in this region take into account
inferences about the intentions or beliefs of the opponent toward
oneself, often considered a hallmark of the psychological construct
of mentalizing.
Another component of the mentalizing network, pSTS, was
found to be correlated with the influence that a player’s action had
on the opponent’s strategy. This area has previously been impli-
cated in processing stimuli related to living agents and biologically
relevant motion (6, 25). Here we provide evidence that this region
is involved in updating an individual’s strategy based on computa-
tions related to the degree of influence an individual has exerted on
their opponent during strategic social interactions. Our computa-
tionalmodeling approach also allowed us to separate out prediction
error signals arising from simple RL from those arising from the
more complex influence updating mechanism, because the update
of expectations in the full influence model is accomplished by a
combination of these two signals. When we tested for the presence
of prediction error signals arising from the RL component of the
model we found significant correlations with those signals in the
ventral striatum bilaterally, consistent with many previous reports
(21, 26, 27). This signal is independent and dissociable from the
influence update signal present instead in pSTS. Taken together
these findings suggest that two distinct updating mechanisms are
present in the human brain at the same time during strategic
interactions: those relating to the difference between the expected
and actual rewards (the RL prediction error) and those related to
the difference between expected and actual influence exerted.
We also explored functional correlations among the three key
brain regions identified as containing signals relevant to our
influence model to test an important implication of our model.
Namely, activity in mPFC particularly at the time that the
outcome is revealed within a trial ought to be correlated with a
linear combination of activity in the two regions containing the
update signals: ventral striatum and pSTS. Consistent with the
predictions of our model, we found a significant increase in
correlations between activity in both ventral striatum and pSTS
with activity in mPFC at the time the outcome was revealed and
the error signals were generated, compared with other time
points in the trial. Moreover, activity in mPFC was better
predicted by a linear combination of activity in these two regions
than by activity in one or the other region alone. These findings
support the conclusion that pSTS, ventral striatum, and mPFC
constitute a functionally interacting network for implementing
the computations relevant to mentalizing.
Although in the present study players understand the effects of
influencing the opponent, a key outstanding issue is how they could
use that knowledge to alter the opponent’s behavior so as to receive
bigger future rewards, such as reputation building and teaching
(20), or Stackelberg strategies, in which one player commits to a
certain strategy and forces the other player to follow suit (28).
Furthermore, although in the present study human players always
faced real human opponents, an interesting question for further
study would be whether similar mechanisms are engaged in these
areas when subjects are playing an intelligently adaptive but non-
human computer, a manipulation often used when probing ‘‘theory
of mind’’ areas in human imaging studies (9–11). Another open
question is whether other animals besides humans have the capacity
for sophisticated strategic computations of this sort, or whether the
capacity to engage in such high-level strategies is a uniquely human
trait. Although previous studies of strategic game playing in rhesus
macaques indicate that these animals do use simpleRLandpossibly
fictitious updating (29–31), it has not yet been addressed whether
they are capable of higher-level strategizing as found here in our
human subjects.
In this study we have taken the first steps in attempting to
characterize the neural underpinnings of mentalizing during stra-
tegic interactions in terms of a simple computational model. mPFC
and pSTS made distinct functional contributions. Whereas activity
in mPFC was found to track the predicted future reward corre-
sponding to a particular choice given the degree of influence
expected, activity in pSTS was found to correspond to an influence
update signal, capturing the difference between the degree of
influence expected on a given trial and the actual influence known
to have occurred once the outcome had been revealed. Accord-
ingly, whereas signals inmPFC relating to expectationsmay be used
to guide choice during game performance, signals in pSTS may be
used to modulate or change influence expectations on the basis of
the actual outcomes experienced. These areas have previously been
implicated inmentalizing and in theory ofmind but have never been
shown to have correlations with distinct computational processes
that may potentially underlie such capacities. More generally, the
present results show how the application of quantitative computa-
tional models to neuroimaging and behavioral data can be used not
only to advance knowledge of simple learning situations but also to
unlock the complexities of social and strategic interactions (32, 33).
Methods
Subjects. Thirty-two healthy normal subjects participated in this study, of which
16 (25  1 years old, seven female) were scanned while playing a competitive
game in pairs with the other 16. Subject pairs were prescreened to make sure that
the subjects in each pair did not know each other before the experiment to
reduce the possibility of collusion. However, data from one pair of subjects was
in fact discarded because of evidence of collusion during the game. The subjects
were also preassessed to exclude those with a prior history of neurological or
psychiatric illness. All subjects gave informed consent, and the study was ap-
proved by the Institute Review Board at California Institute of Technology.
Task. Functional imaging was conducted by using a Siemens 3.0 Tesla Trio MRI
scanner to acquire gradient echo T2*-weighted echoplanar images. Each pair of
subjects underwent three game sessions. One subject used a computer terminal
and keyboard to play the game while the other was in the scanner using goggles
as visual input (Resonance Technologies) and a button box to choose an action.
The first session, of 50 trials, was for training; the second two sessions, of 100 trials
each,are reported in thisarticle.Player rolesalternatedbetweenthetwosubjects
in each session. Thus, the scanned subjects reported in this paper played both
roles in subsequent sessions (employer and employee). We also included ran-
domly intermixed null event trials, which accounted for 33% of the total number
of trials in a session. These trials consist of the presentation of a fixation cross for
7 s. Before entering the scanner, subjects were informed that they would receive
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what they earned in a randomly selected session (not training), plus an additional
$10. The payoff matrix’s association with players’ roles and actions (Fig. 1 A and
B) remainedfixedthroughoutanexperimentbutwas rotatedacrossexperiments
to create a balanced design with respect to roles and role actions. However, for
convenience, we refer to the roles of employer and employee as having the
payoff matrix defined in Fig. 1B.
fMRI Scanning Parameters. To optimize functional sensitivity in OFC we acquired
thedatausinganobliqueorientationof30°totheanterior–posteriorcommissure
line. A total of 580 volumes (19 min) were collected during the experiment in an
interleaved ascending manner. The imaging parameters were as follows: echo
time, 30 ms; field of view, 192 mm; in-plane resolution and slice thickness, 3 mm;
TR, 2 s. High-resolution T1-weighted structural scans (1  1  1 mm) were
acquired for anatomical localization. Image analysis was performed by using
SPM2 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology,
London). Preprocessing included slice timing correction (centered at TR/2), mo-
tion correction, spatial normalization to a standard T2* template with a resa-
mpled voxel size of 3 mm, and spatial smoothing using an 8-mm Gaussian kernel.
Intensitynormalizationandhigh-pass temporalfiltering (128s)werealsoapplied
to the data (34).
Behavioral Data Analysis. Details of the computational models used in the
analysis are provided in SI Methods and summarized in Table 1. Model parame-
ters were estimated by maximizing simultaneously the logistic log likelihood of
the predicted decision probabilities generated by a model against the actual
behavior of all subjects. Parameters for the employer and employee roles were
fitted separately to account for any differences. We used the multivariate con-
strained minimization function (fmincon) of the Optimization Toolbox 2.2 in
Matlab 6.5 (Mathworks) for this fitting procedure (see SI Methods and Table S1
for more details). All behavioral data shown correspond to the actions of all 30
participants.
fMRI Data Analysis. The event-related fMRI data were analyzed by constructing
sets of delta (stick) functions at the time of the choice and at the time of the
outcome. Additional regressors were constructed by using the model estimated
choice expected values as a modulating parameter at the time of choice and one
or more (depending on the model) update signals as modulating parameters at
the time of outcome. All of these regressors were convolved with a canonical
hemodynamic response function. In addition, the six scan-to-scan motion param-
eters produced during realignment were included to account for residual motion
effects. These were fitted to each subject individually, and the regression param-
eterswere thentakentotherandom-effects level.All reportedfMRI statisticsand
uncorrected P values arose from group random-effects analyses (n  15), and
small-volume corrected P values were obtained from 8-mm spheres around
regions of interest previously implicated in mentalizing from a metaanalysis by
Frith and Frith (3). Specifically, coordinates were defined from the center of each
of the areas delineated from the metaanalysis: mPFC (0, 56, 19 mm), STS (53,
51,10mm),andthetemporalpoles (46,11,35mm).Anacross-subjectmodel
likelihood difference modulator was also fitted at the second level, alongside the
mean group level effect, when studying the influence signal in Fig. 3.
We also compared the influence and RL algorithms with each other by fitting
bothmodelsat thesametimeagainst thefMRIdata (Fig.2B). Tomakethemodels
as similar as possible, we normalized all modulating regressors before fitting to
the fMRI data. Areas showing significant activity for any regressor of a given
model indicated regions that were better explained by that model in comparison
to the other. This approach for model comparison, as well as the alternative ROI
approach, is explained in more detail in SI Methods.
Details of the interregion correlation analysis are also provided in SIMethods.
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